Late August marked a significant milestone in U.S. foreign policy and military strategy, even if its implications are yet to be properly recognized. The death toll of U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan has now reached two thousand.
Half of that number came in the first nine years of the campaign. The second half came in just the past twenty-seven months, after the implementation of the counterinsurgency strategy (COIN) in Afghanistan. Five years after COIN’s ascendancy, it is time to critically analyze the empirical evidence from the strategy. The empirical data suggests that the predominant U.S. military strategy of the past half decade has not worked.
Commentary: COIN’s Failure in Afghanistan | The National Interest.
On May 29, 2012, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (the Taliban) issued a statement condemning biased foreign and domestic media that “put out the news, most of the time false news, and makes the judgment by itself [sic].” The Taliban accused NATO of “utiliz[ing] the media just to distort the realities, to confuse the minds of the local and international community and just to resist the ongoing struggle inside Afghanistan.” The statement also criticized what the Taliban see as a lack of coverage of human rights violations committed by NATO forces, complaining, “the pro-colonialism media do not put a glance on it as if it is blind and deaf.” Further, the group commended “independent media which could not be bought by colonial powers.”
Complete PDF at: http://www.flashpoint-intel.com/images/documents/pdf/0510/flashpoint_taliban05292012.pdf