U.S. and USSR/Russian nuclear weapons stockpiles, 1945–2005. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
The anti-nuclear movement argues that the abolition of nuclear weapons is ultimately both desirable and possible. The movement’s recent fortunes, however, suggest a more complicated picture, as Lawrence Wittner’s profile of the movement demonstrates.
Getting to Zero — Is Nuclear Abolition Desirable and/or Feasible?.
By Frank V. Pabian and Siegfried S. Hecker
Shortly after its failed April 13 rocket launch, North Korea was widely expected to conduct its third underground nuclear test. Such a test would have fit the pattern of the first two nuclear tests, both of which followed failed rocket launches and international condemnation. And Pyongyang has compelling technical, military, and political reasons to conduct a third nuclear test that would demonstrate it can miniaturize nuclear warheads to fit on a missile, making its nuclear arsenal more threatening.
We believe the first two North Korean tests used plutonium as the fissile material. Without at least one more successful plutonium test, it is unlikely that Pyongyang could have confidence in a miniaturized plutonium design. The country has a very small plutonium stockpile, sufficient for only four to eight bombs, but it may be willing to sacrifice some material to gain additional data to augment information already obtained from the previous two tests.
Complete Article http://www.thebulletin.org/print/web-edition/features/contemplating-third-nuclear-test-north-korea
- Although details of the Iranian nuclear negotiations are scarce, Tehran seems to be taking the tightening of sanctions – especially a possible boycott of Iranian oil — seriously.
- To reduce world suspicions of its intent, Iran needs to make concessions on its uranium enrichment practices and quietly provide real but unpublicized assurances that any weapons research program is history.
- To provide Iran political cover, world powers should consider accepting Tehran’s claims that its nuclear program is peaceful, integrating the program into the global nuclear economy, and undercutting Tehran’s attempts to retain nuclear autonomy.
Después de un paréntesis de 15 meses, Irán y los miembros permanentes del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas, más Alemania, denominado P5 +1, se reunieron en Estambul para discutir el programa nuclear de Irán. Las relaciones entre Irán y las grandes potencias se han vuelto tan amargas que, cuando terminaron las reuniones, todos los lados vieron el acuerdo para reunirse nuevamente el próximo mes en Bagdad como un triunfo diplomático importante.