Commentary: COIN’s Failure in Afghanistan | The National Interest

Late August marked a significant milestone in U.S. foreign policy and military strategy, even if its implications are yet to be properly recognized. The death toll of U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan has now reached two thousand.

Half of that number came in the first nine years of the campaign. The second half came in just the past twenty-seven months, after the implementation of the counterinsurgency strategy (COIN) in Afghanistan. Five years after COIN’s ascendancy, it is time to critically analyze the empirical evidence from the strategy. The empirical data suggests that the predominant U.S. military strategy of the past half decade has not worked.


Commentary: COIN’s Failure in Afghanistan | The National Interest.


U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan: Five Lessons We Should Have Learned (ASP)


afghanistan (Photo credit: The U.S. Army)

Much discussion of the war focuses on narrow issues like military doctrine or troop surges, but there are more fundamental lessons that need to be learned from the last ten years of war. US policy has been hobbled by magical thinking, misunderstanding the country of Afghanistan, ignoring politics, poor planning, and a disturbing refusal to plan for the future.

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Estrategia de EE.UU. en Afganistán: Cinco lecciones que deberíamos haber aprendido (American Security Project)

Buena parte del debate de la guerra se centra en temas específicos como la doctrina militar de tropas o escaladas de tensión, pero hay más lecciones fundamentales que deben ser aprendidas de los últimos diez años de guerra. La política de EE.UU. ha sido obstaculizada por el pensamiento mágico, la incomprensión de Afganistán, haciendo caso omiso de la política, la mala planificación, y la negativa preocupante para planificar para el futuro.

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